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The view that participationby the respondent state enhances the
perceived legitimacy of internationaljudicialor arbitralproceedings
may play a significant role in a decision not to participate. Such a
decision may be prompted by political rather than legal
considerations. The object of nonparticipationmay be to facilitate
exercise of a political option of noncompliance with the judgment or
award, notwithstandingprior agreement that it is legally binding. If
so, then the basic issue is not nonparticipationas such, but rather
noncompliance with a legally binding award or judgment, as well as
a legally binding commitment to arbitrateor adjudicate disputes. This
raisesfundamental questions regarding the role of legitimacy, and
indeed the rule of law, in internationalaffairs.
International law requires the consent of the respondent state to the
submission of a dispute to international arbitration or adjudication resulting in an
award or judgment that is binding upon the states party to the case. Such consent
may be granted before or after a dispute arises. This essay examines the role of
perceptions of legitimacy in a respondent's decision not to participate in stateto-state arbitration or adjudication, notwithstanding the fact that such consent
was granted in advance by treaty.
In his influential book, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas
Franck analyzed the role of perceptions of legitimacy in what he styled the
"compliance pull" of rules in an international setting. 1 As between states, that
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z389W0901J
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setting generally lacks the elements of compulsion found in municipal legal
systems. In this regard, Franck observed, "Someday, perhaps, the international
system will come to have law and legal institutions that resemble their domestic
counterparts, although a world of five billion persons could (and should) never
have a centralized legal system mirroring that of the nations." ' 2 Franck added, "In
any event, that is not the condition of the global rule system now, and it is not
'3
likely to be in the foreseeable future."
David Caron's penetrating analysis of particular aspects of legitimacy
4
expressly acknowledged the contribution made by Franck's seminal study.
Caron was not alone in citing Franck's research. The group includes even those
who, like me, are not entirely persuaded by a sharp dichotomy in which
compulsion accounts for obedience to law in the municipal system while
perceptions of legitimacy account for the compliance pull of rules in the
international system: they too are likely to recognize the significance of Franck's
insights on the role of legitimacy in the functioning of the international system
itself.
For my part, I take my cue from David Caron and try to focus the object of
my inquiry more sharply. That object is participation in dispute settlement
proceedings between states-or to be more precise, nonparticipation and
perceptions of legitimacy.
The classic model of binding third-party settlements between states is one
in which they agree to submit a particular dispute to such settlement after the
dispute has arisen. 5 Under that model, the time between the compromissory

2. Id. at 39-40.
3.
Id. at 40.
4. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the CollectiveAuthority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 552, 556 n.19 (1993) (describing Franck's book, supra note 3, as "[a] central part of the recent
international law discussion"). Caron's article is directed to the question of perceptions of legitimacy
concerning a political organ, namely the UN Security Council. The fact that the Council is endowed by
the UN Charter with the authority to make decisions that are binding on all UN member states raises issues
that are in some respects analogous to those addressed in this essay, and that are of no less importance to
the international system.
5.
Citations to such a case may use a "" between the parties' names rather than the letter "v" to
signal that both parties have submitted the dispute and, in that sense, there is no applicant or respondent.
In this situation, there is often a period of months or years during which the parties have attempted to
resolve a legal dispute through negotiation, but have failed to do so. Then, if they are both in agreement
on this course of action, they may submit the dispute to a "third party" that may be a particular individual
or group or institution. Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations spells out a wide range of choices.
The agreement may seek assistance (such as mediation) or nonbinding recommendations (such as
conciliation). Where the parties agree to seek a binding decision, the "third party" may be a standing
international court or tribunal such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, whose members are elected by the UN General Assembly and Security Council) or
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (established by the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, whose members are elected by the parties to the Convention). See Statute of the International
Court of Justice, arts. 92 96; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
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agreement and the proceedings is typically brief, and buyer's remorse, if any,
might be expected to emerge only after the judgment or award.
The practice of affording an aggrieved party a unilateral right of access to
binding third-party dispute settlement processes finds its origin in municipal
law. 6 In statecraft if you will. Among the many reasons for affording such a right
of access is perhaps the most basic one of maintaining public order. Unresolved
disputes and accumulation of grievances can disrupt public order and undermine
social cohesion.
Maintenance of public order is of course relevant to the international system
as well. The UN Charter expressly acknowledges the link to settlement of
disputes between states. 7 While the desirability of promoting resolution of
disputes between states did yield a new norm requiring peaceful settlement of
disputes, no general international norm of conduct emerged requiring arbitration
or adjudication of unresolved disputes between states at the request of either
party. 8 Rather, the technique used to effect the latter change is expressly
consensual and specific, namely a treaty that affords one party the right to submit

1833 U.N.T.S. 397, Part XV, sec. 2; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI. Alternatively, it
may be an ad hoc arbitral tribunal comprised of a member or members selected by the parties or a designee
pursuant to agreed rules, for which a standing institution such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration may
perform registry functions. The World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body utilizes a
combination of an ad hoc panel and a standing appellate body. See World Trade Organization,
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art 1; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
6. See,
e.g.,
LEGES
DUODECIM
TABULARUM,
tbl.
I,
law
I,
available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancienttwelve-tables.asp (stating "[i]f the plaintiff summons the defendant to
court the defendant shall go. If the defendant does not go the plaintiff shall call a witness thereto. Only
then the plaintiff shall seize the defendant").
7.
Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations requires all UN members to "settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered." Article 33 of the Charter obliges the parties to seek a solution of "any dispute,
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Well
before the drafting of the UN Charter, there were prominent Americans who believed that creating a new
standing international court to settle disputes between states would help avert war. In 1916, Charles Evans
Hughes argued,
We know the recurrence of war is not to be prevented by pious wishes. If the conflict of
national interests is not to be brought to the final test of force, there must be the development
of international organization in order to provide international justice and to safeguard so far as
practicable the peace of the world ....
There should be an international tribunal to decide
controversies susceptible of judicial determination, thus affording the advantage of judicial
standards in the settlement of particular disputes and the gradual growth of a body of judicial
precedents.
Charles Evans Hughes, Address in Accepting the RepublicanNomination for President(July 31, 1916),
ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EvANS HUGHES, 1906 1916, pp. 8, 33 34 (2d ed. 1916).
8.
Neither Article 2, paragraph 3, nor Article 33 of the UN Charter requires arbitration or
adjudication as such. Article 33 requires the parties to seek a solution to the dispute "by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." U.N. Charter art. 33.
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certain future disputes with another party to a specified tribunal whose decision
is accepted in advance as binding.
There is nothing novel or unusual about using contract or treaty to make
advance commitments. In this regard it is presumably understood that a legal
regime rooted in consent can function only if consent has consequences.
Yet the notion has persisted that arbitration or adjudication of disputes
between states is best used where the parties agree to do so after the dispute
arises. 9 This classic perception rears its head most obviously when a state is sued,
and deploys its lawyers to suggest that submission of the dispute to arbitration or
adjudication against the current will of the respondent is inappropriate, and
indeed, illegitimate. 10
Arguments in support of that conclusion can be, and typically are, presented
before the tribunal itself in the form of objections to jurisdiction and
admissibility. The best known cases of refusal to participate contain something
more: the basis of jurisdiction asserted by the applicant is an instrument in which
advance consent to jurisdiction was granted by the respondent well before the
particular dispute ripened. 11

9.
See Shigeru Oda, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice:A Myth?,
49 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 251, 257 (2000).
10.
For example, in the context of publicly explaining its decision not to participate in the South
China Sea arbitration, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated, inter alia, "China always stands
that, with regard to the relevant disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, a true
solution can only be sought through bilateral negotiation and consultation." That statement was enclosed
with a letter from the Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands reiterating that, "China does not accept or
participate in this arbitration." The letter was delivered by the Chinese embassy to the registry of the
arbitral tribunal (the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague). S. China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China),
Award, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-19, 97 (July 12, 2016), availableat https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/
(visited Dec. 22, 2018).
11.
In the original Nuclear Tests cases, in which France declined to appear, the alternative bases of
jurisdiction invoked by Australia were the General Act of 1928 as well as the Australian and French
declarations under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Interim Protection, 1973
I.C.J. Rep. 99, 14 (June 22). The Australian and French declarations cited by Australia were registered
respectively on February 6, 1954 and May 20, 1966. See Declaration recognizing as compulsory the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Austl., 186 U.N.T.S. 77 (Feb. 6, 1954); Declaration
recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Fr., 562 U.N.T.S. 71 (May
16, 1966). In the South China Sea and Arctic Sunrise arbitrations, in which China and Russia respectively
declined to appear, the basis of jurisdiction was section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS, notably Articles 286
to 288. S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, at 60; Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No.22,
Provisional Measures Order, 2013 ITLOS REP. 230,
36 (Nov. 22, 2013) available at
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no.22/published/C22-Order-22 i11i3.pdf;
Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2014-02, 49 (Nov. 26, 2014)
available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1325 (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). The dates on which
the parties to the respective arbitrations ratified UNCLOS are as follows:
South China Sea: Philippines - May 8, 1984, China - June 7, 1996;
Arctic Sunrise: Netherlands - June 28, 1996, Russia - March 12,1997.
See U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United Nations Conventions on
the Law of the Sea [... ] as at 31 March 2019, Table recapitulatingthe status of the Convention and of the
relatedAgreements, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status20i8.pdf.
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Acceptance of such compromissory instruments used to be exceptional, but
that is changing. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is one such compromissory instrument. 12 The Convention's
substantive reach is very broad. The United Nations website now lists 168
parties. 13 Since its entry into force in 1994, many cases have been arbitrated and
adjudicated under the Convention's compulsory jurisdiction provisions with the
participation of both parties to the case. 14
This pattern of participation was interrupted in 2013. China declined to
participate in the South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines in
January of that year. 15 In the South China Sea arbitration, the Philippines
asserted that there was no valid basis for China's claims that it was entitled to
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over maritime areas off the Philippine coast,
and that China's construction of artificial islands and installations and other
actions pursuant to those claims violated Philippine sovereign rights and
jurisdiction under UNCLOS as well as China's duties under UNCLOS with
respect to navigation safety, fishing, and protection and preservation of the
marine environment. 16
Then Russia declined to participate in the Arctic Sunrise arbitration initiated
by the Netherlands in October of the same year. 17 In that case, the Netherlands
asserted that the freedom of navigation guaranteed by UNCLOS was violated by
Russia's boarding of a Netherlands flag vessel (the Arctic Sunrise) in its
exclusive economic zone, and subsequent detention at Murmansk of the ship and

12.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, at Part XV, sec. 2.
13.
Status of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 11, at 1 9.
14.
As of December 2018, both parties had appeared in twenty-four cases before ITLOS and in
eleven cases before arbitral tribunals constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS. Five of the ITLOS cases
concerned provisional measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII. See
CONTENTIOUS CASES, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (last visited Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/contentious-cases;

ARBITRATION

SERVICES

UNITED

NATIONS

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (last visited Dec. 14,2018),
https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/; Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v.
Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Aug. 4, 2000, Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex
VII of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, at 2-4, available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of August
4_2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
15.
S. China Sea Arb., Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-19,
at 10, available at https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/ (visited Dec. 22, 2018).
16.
S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, at
7 10. I had the honor of serving as counsel for
the Philippines in the South China Sea case. That relationship ended with the arbitration. I alone am
responsible for the views expressed herein and for the summary of the lengthy award to be found in my
previous article. See Bernard H. Oxman, The South China Sea Arbitration Award, 24 U. MIAMI INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 235 (2017) (discussing the award).
17. Arctic Sunrise, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at
2, 9, 43, 46, 65. Russia also declined
to participate in the provisional measures proceedings instituted by the Netherlands before ITLOS pending
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Arctic Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 11, 2013
ITLOS REP. 48.
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the persons on board, against whom charges were filed. 18 The ship was chartered
by Greenpeace, and had carried out a protest at a Russian offshore oil platform
before being boarded and detained. 19
In both of these cases, the dispute submitted to arbitration arose after
UNCLOS entered into force for the parties, the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions of UNCLOS were the asserted basis of jurisdiction, and the
nonparticipating respondent asserted that jurisdiction was lacking under
UNCLOS for the reasons it indicated.20
Then in 2018, asserting that "the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction,"
Venezuela declined to appear in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a case
brought by Guyana regarding a territorial dispute over the area between the

18. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), supra note 11, Provisional Measures Order, at
59, 90 (Nov.
22, 2013).
19. Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits, supra note 11, at
3, 4 (Aug. 14, 2015). Some observers
may have found Russia's failure to participate somewhat surprising because Russia had previously
participated as both applicant and respondent in cases brought under the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions of the Convention. Volga (Russ. v. Austl.), Case No. 11, Judgment of Dec. 23, 2002, 2002
ITLOS Rep. 10; Hoshinmaru (Japan v. Russ.), Case No. 14, Judgment of Aug. 6, 2007, 2005-2007 ITLOS
Rep. 18; Tomimaru (Japan v. Russ.), Case No. 15, Judgment of Aug. 6, 2007, 2005-2007 ITLOS Rep. 74.
Russia then resumed its earlier pattern of participation under the Convention. See Dispute Concerning
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06,
Procedural Order No. 3 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2018), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2446 (procedure for
addressing Russia's jurisdictional objections). However, in connection with Ukraine's request to ITLOS
for provisional measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS Annex VII in
another case subsequently submitted by Ukraine, Russia informed ITLOS "of its decision not to participate
in the hearing on provisional measures in the case initiated by Ukraine, without prejudice to the question
of its participation in the subsequent arbitration if, despite the obvious lack of jurisdiction of the Annex
VII tribunal whose constitution Ukraine is requesting, the matter proceeds further." Case Concerning the
Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No.26, Provisional Measures
Order, 2019 ITLOS Rep. at
8 (May 25, 2019) available at https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no 26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf.
Russia
submitted
written
observations shortly thereafter on jurisdictional and other requirements for provisional measures.
Memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation, May 7, 2019, available at
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no 26fMemorandum.pdf. These were more
detailed than the reasons communicated in Arctic Sunrise, supra note 11. (Reference to the Detention of
Three UkrainianNaval Vessels case was added only to certain footnotes because the relevant events in
the case occurred when the processing of this manuscript was at an advanced stage.)
20. Russia's concise communication of its jurisdictional reasons for not participating was delivered
at the outset of provisional measures proceedings. Arctic Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note
11, at 19. In the South China Sea case, China's jurisdictional arguments were spelled out in detail in a
position paper that the foreign ministry made public and transmitted to the arbitrators shortly before the
deadline for submission of a counter-memorial. S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, at 13. In both
cases the respective arbitral tribunals treated the jurisdictional positions presented by the nonparticipants
as pleas on jurisdiction. Id. at 1114-15; Arctic Sunrise, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at
5 6.
Both tribunals considered and ruled on the respondents' jurisdictional objections before proceeding to the
merits, although certain jurisdictional issues were deferred for consideration in connection with the merits
in the South China Sea arbitration. S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, at
45, 60 (H), (I); Arctic
Sunrise, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at sec. V. Years earlier, in the Nuclear Tests cases, France
had spelled out the basis for its jurisdictional conclusions in a letter informing the Court of its reasons for
declining to participate. Nuclear Tests, Interim Protection, supra note 11, at 15.
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Essequibo River and the boundary drawn by an 1899 arbitral award. 2 1 Albeit
with some temporary lapses, such nonappearance has not occurred in the ICJ in
many years. 22 Guyana predicates jurisdiction in the case on a decision choosing
the ICJ as the next means for settlement of the dispute that was made by the UN
Secretary-General in January 2018 in the exercise of his functions under a 1966
agreement to which Guyana and Venezuela are party. 23 One difference between
this case and the other recent cases is that, although the asserted basis for the
respondent's consent to jurisdiction is an agreement concluded over one halfcentury earlier, this agreement was reached after the dispute had arisen and for
24
the specific purpose of finding means to resolve it.
In considering the motivations for a state's decision not to appear in
proceedings instituted by another state, an interesting underlying question is
whether the reasons for nonparticipation are legal or political. As previously
noted, the respondent may assert that it declines to appear because the court or
tribunal lacks jurisdiction. But in a case between states in an international
tribunal, the jurisdictional requirement is consent, which is typically manifested
by prior agreement and does not depend on actual appearance. Indeed, procedural
rules may specifically contemplate the respondent's absence. 25 Moreover, a
liberal position on the right of a state to decline to appear may facilitate its
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in the first place. There may be reasons
for nonparticipation in a particular case that are not necessarily anticipated or
made known. With this in mind, let us take a closer look at what may be the
objectives of nonparticipation in many situations, albeit not all.
Where a dispute between states has been submitted by one party to an
international court or tribunal, the respondent that believes there is no jurisdiction
may be concerned that an appearance to contest jurisdiction legitimates the

21. See Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guy. v. Ven.), Order, 2018 I.C.J. Rep. (June 19),
available athttps://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/171 (visited Dec. 18, 2018).
22. France declined to appear in the original Nuclear Tests cases, which were concluded in 1974.
Nuclear Tests, supra note 11, Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, at 14 (Dec. 20). The United States, after
participating in the provisional measures and jurisdictional phases, withdrew in January 1985 from further
participation in the case brought against it by Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
10 11, 17 (June 27).
23.
Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899, supra note 21, Application, paras. 14-25; see also Statement
attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the border controversy between Guyana and
Venezuela (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.un.org/sg/en/contentsg/statemenU2018-01-30/statementattributable- spokesman- secretary-general-border.
24. Agreement to Resolve the Controversy Between Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland Over the Frontier Between Venezuela and British Guiana, Feb. 17, 1966,
561 U.N.T.S. 323. The agreement's object is solution "of the controversy between Venezuela and the
United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of
1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void." Id., art. I. The agreement
was negotiated by the United Kingdom "in consultation with the Government of British Guiana." Id. at
preamble. Upon attainment of independence, Guyana became a party to the agreement. Id., art. VIII.
25.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 53; see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 5, at Annex VII, art. 9, Annex VIII, art. 4.
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proceedings. While the respondent's jurisdictional arguments are doubtless legal
in nature, the underlying concern prompting nonparticipation may be more
political than legal. The respondent's appearance does not in itself concede
jurisdictional objections. But the respondent's prior consent to jurisdiction may
well have included consent to the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal to resolve
a dispute as to its jurisdiction. Many compromissory agreements expressly or
impliedly confer jurisdiction on a tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction,
26
whether or not the respondent appears.
Another reason why parties may choose not to participate, or may withdraw
at a later stage of proceedings, is that the time available to the respondent to make
a decision as to participation may be limited, at least with respect to the initial
phases of the process. This may in part explain the nature of early decisions on
the matter. The United States withdrew from participation in the case brought
against it by Nicaragua regarding military activities only after the ICJ had
27
rendered its order on provisional measures and its judgment on jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in the South China Sea case, China took less than a month to
reject the arbitration and return the notification and statement of claim to the
Philippines. 28 Russia similarly rejected the submission of the Arctic Sunrise
dispute to arbitration in less than a month; it did so a day after the Netherlands
requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to prescribe
29
provisional measures pending constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
The right of an applicant to request provisional measures pending a final
judgment or award may influence a decision to decline participation. The fact
that urgency is a typical characteristic of such situations has important
consequences. Commencement of proceedings in respect of a request for
provisional measures may be all but simultaneous with submission of the
dispute. 30 And a decision on provisional measures is not dependent upon a
26. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 53; Id. at art. 36, 6; U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 5, at art. 288,
4. "This power, known as the principle of 'KompetenzKompetenz' in German or 'la competence de Ia competence' in French, is part, and indeed a major part,
of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal, consisting of its 'jurisdiction
to determine its own jurisdiction.' It is a necessary component in the exercise of the judicial function and
does not need to be expressly provided for in the constitutive documents of those tribunals, although this
is often done." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14,
10 11, 17 (June 27).
28. S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-19 at 29 (July 12,
2016).
29. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 11, at 11; Provisional Measures Order, at 9.
30. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, Nicaragua's request for provisional measures
was simultaneous with the submission of the case on April 9, 1984. The United States participated in the
provisional measures and jurisdictional phases of the proceedings, but withdrew from participation
following the Court's determination that it had jurisdiction and did not participate in the proceedings on
the merits. Militaryand ParamilitaryActivities, supra note 22, at
10, 11, 17. In the Nuclear Tests cases,
Australia filed its application on May 9, 1973 and its request for provisional measures on the same day.
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definitive determination of jurisdiction by the tribunal; the existence of an
instrument that appears, prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which
jurisdiction might be founded may be sufficient. 3 1 While decisions on
provisional measures, as a legal matter, are without prejudice to adjudication of
issues of jurisdiction or the merits, provisional measures ordered by an
32
international tribunal are legally binding under the express text of UNCLOS
33
and under the Statute of the ICJ as interpreted by the Court.
Accordingly, a provisional measures order presents the respondent with a
choice between compliance with a tribunal decision and breach of a legal
obligation to comply. As a legal matter, the order is binding whether or not the
respondent participates in the proceedings. There is, moreover, little if any
evidence that nonappearance reduces the risk that a tribunal will order
provisional measures. 34 We may therefore conclude that, to the extent
nonappearance is rooted in concerns regarding provisional measures, those
concerns also may be more political than legal.
Even where provisional measures are not sought, the question of
participation may arise quickly for the respondent. If the dispute has been
submitted to arbitration, the parties typically have a limited period of time in
which to appoint arbitrators, after which the arbitrators are named by the
appointing authority specified in the compromissory instrument. 35 While
participation in the appointment process does not imply acceptance of
jurisdiction, it may be perceived as conferring legitimacy on the submission of
the dispute to arbitration. Moreover, there may be a perception that, as a political
matter, it is more difficult to decline to comply with a decision by a panel if one
participates in its appointment. In both the South China Sea arbitration and the

Nuclear Tests, Interim Protection, supra note 11, at
1. In the Arctic Sunrise case, the Netherlands
submitted the dispute to arbitration on October 4, 2014 and submitted its request for provisional measures
to ITLOS on October 21, a few days more than the two-week minimum specified in UNCLOS art. 290,
para. 5. Arctic Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 11, at
36 38. Similarly, the respective
dates were March 31 and April 16, 2019 in the Detention of Three UkrainianNaval Vessels case, supra
note 19, at preamble, 1. There was no request for provisional measures in the South China Sea arbitration,
although the Notification and Statement of Claim expressly reserved the right to request such measures.
See S. China SeaArb., supra note 10, Phil. Mem'l Vol. 3, Annex 1, 43, Annex 5, 46; see also S. China
Sea Arb., Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 15, at 44.
31.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Interim Protection Order, 1972 I.C.J. 12, 17 (Aug. 17).
32. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, at art. 290, para. 6.
33.
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, 9N 99 109 (June 27). See Fisheries
Jurisdiction,supra note 31, at [20.
34. Provisional measures were sought and ordered in the Nuclear Tests, Arctic Sunrise and
Detention of Three UkrainianNaval Vessels cases. Nuclear Tests, Interim Protection, supra note 11, 1973
I.C.J. Rep. at 106; Arctic Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 11, 2013 ITLOS Rep. at 105;
Detention of Three UkrainianNaval Vessels, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 19, 2019 ITLOS
Rep. at
124. The United States participated at the provisional measures stage of the Military and
ParamilitaryActivities case. See Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua,supra
note 30, at 17.
35.
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, Annex VII, art. 3.
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Arctic Sunrise arbitration, the respondents did not participate in the appointment
36
of the members of the respective arbitral tribunals.
Reasons for nonparticipation in a case are of course not limited to
jurisdictional concerns. The respondent's main concern may be losing on the
merits. It may be tempting to suppose that nonparticipation reduces the
likelihood or severity of an adverse outcome on the merits. While it is of course
difficult to know what would have happened had the respondent participated
fully in the proceedings, this argument does not appear to find a great deal of
support in the results of the two recent cases of nonparticipation. The applicant
prevailed in both cases. This suggests that the underlying objective of
nonparticipation in many circumstances may be to strengthen the option of
noncompliance with an adverse judgment or award on the merits. Since the
judgment or award is legally binding under the compromissory instrument to
which the nonparticipating party adhered, here too the reason for
37
nonparticipation may be more political than legal.
Are there perhaps procedural advantages
that may suggest
nonparticipation? It is evident that nonparticipation by the respondent, even if it
does not alter the burden of proof as legal matter, may increase the burdens on
the applicant 38 and the tribunal as practical matter. 39 Like the ICJ Statute,

36. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII provides that appointments not made by the
parties within the specified time period are to be made by the ITLOS president. Id. In both the Arctic
Sunrise and South China Sea arbitrations, the applicant appointed one arbitrator and the ITLOS president
appointed the remaining four. A few Chinese critics complained that the ITLOS president who made those
appointments in the South China Sea case was a former Japanese diplomat. See Jesse Johnson, Beijing
Turns on Japanese Judge as Hague Tribunal Ruling Over South China Seas Nears, JAPAN TIMES
(July 8, 2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/national/politics-diplomacy/beijing-turnsjapanese-judge-hague-tribunal-ruling-south-china-sea-nears/#.XO88uS2ZM5h. Of course any discomfort
within China in this regard might have been avoided by participation in the appointment process. See U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, at Annex VII, art. 3(c) (e).
37.
The fact that the respondent's government may be under internal pressure to decline to
participate does not in itself alter the analysis. That said, in some cases internal constitutional constraints
may complicate the calculus. It might be noted in this regard that great care was taken to minimize the
risk of noncompliance with an ultimate judgment or award in the Gulf of Maine case (in which I
participated on the U.S. side). The United States Senate was actively engaged in the formulation of the
final text of the treaty with Canada submitting the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary dispute to a chamber
of the ICJ constituted for that purpose (the first time this was done) or to arbitration in the event that a
chamber whose composition was satisfactory to the parties was not established. Maritime Boundary
Settlement Treaty, Can.-U.S., Mar. 29, 1979, 33 U.S.T. 2797; see also S. REP. No. 96-1, at 4 (1981).
38.
See Oscar Schachter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 230 31 (1991). The
principal burdens relate to the conduct of the arbitration or adjudication. In the case of an arbitration, the
costs of the arbitral tribunal itself may be implicated as well. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or
specified by the tribunal, remuneration and expenses of an arbitral tribunal are ordinarily borne equally
by the states parties, as are the advance deposits. However, the nonparticipating respondents in the two
recent arbitrations did not pay their deposits. As a result, in order to cover the costs of the tribunal, each
applicant had to pay the deposits due from both parties, with uncertain prospects for recouping the
respondent's share later pursuant to the final award.
39.
The preamble of a 1991 resolution of the Institute of International Law noted:
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UNCLOS does not provide for default judgments: it specifies that, in the absence
of the respondent, the tribunal "must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction
over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." 40 There
is however little, if any, evidence that the shift of burdens to the applicant and
the tribunal inures to the ultimate benefit of the nonparticipant. Even if
nonparticipation forces one's opponent and the tribunal to work much harder, the
end result may be a more thorough and persuasive opinion rejecting the
nonparticipant's position. Once again, the reasons for nonparticipation would
appear to be political, not legal.
Nonparticipation also presents an issue regarding duties of the parties that
is arguably independent of the question of nonparticipation as such.41 The South
China Sea award acknowledges the respondent's option not to appear and
articulates its duties as a party to the case in the following terms:
China has been free to represent itself in these proceedings in the manner it
considered most appropriate, including by refraining from any formal
appearance, as it has in fact done. The decision of how best to represent
China's position is a matter for China, not the Tribunal. China is not free,
however, to act to undermine the integrity of these proceedings or to frustrate
the effectiveness of the Tribunal's decisions. The Convention and general

the difficulties that non-appearance of a party may present in some circumstances for the other
party or parties and for the Court itself, especially with regard to:
a) the full implementation of the principle of the equality of the parties; and
b) the acquisition by the Court of knowledge of facts which may be relevant for the Court's
pronouncements on interim measures, preliminary objections or the merits.
Institute of International Law, Non-Appearance Before the InternationalCourt of Justice, at 2 (1991),
http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1991 bal 01_en.pdf.
40.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, at Annex VI, art. 28; see also id. at Annex
VII, art. 9, Annex VIII, art. 4. These provisions are based on Article 53, paragraph 2, of the ICJ Statute.
In the Arctic Sunrise arbitration, Russia's nonparticipation deprived the tribunal of potentially important
information and perspectives regarding Russia's interpretation of its laws and the measures it took. Arctic
Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 11, at
i119,54. In the South China Sea arbitration, both
the applicant and the tribunal went to great lengths to identify and probe all potential legal and factual
issues. The Award expressly addresses the legal and practical consequences of China's nonparticipation.
S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 11, at 116 144.
41.
In the United States, the defendant's decision on whether to appear in a civil action to defend
the case is ordinarily addressed strictly in terms of the defendant's interests, if any, in risking a default
judgment, with little if any suggestion of a duty to appear to defend. Students of international law learn
that France under Napoleon refused to appear to defend an action in a U.S. court regarding a French
warship detained in a civil action. Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall ruled on grounds
of immunity from jurisdiction that the ship must be released, with no suggestion that France was under a
duty to appear. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 143 (1812). While modern statutes on
sovereign immunity have added considerable nuance to the applicable law and procedure, it remains
doubtful that a foreign sovereign is considered to be under a duty to appear in a municipal court. The
restrictions on default judgments in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act suggest that
nonappearance is not regarded as improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2018).
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international law limit the actions a party may take in the course of ongoing
42
dispute resolution proceedings.

Judges and arbitrators have not always taken such a liberal view of the right
of the respondent to decline to appear. Some years earlier, in their joint separate
opinion with respect to the provisional measures prescribed by International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Arctic Sunrise case, Judges Wolfrum and
Kelly linked the question of nonparticipation with the question of the duties of a
party to the case. They wrote:
[N]on-appearance is contrary to the object and purpose of the dispute
settlement system under Part XV of the Convention .... Judicial proceedings
are based on a legal discourse between the parties and the co-operation of
both parties with the international court or tribunal in question. Nonappearance cripples this process. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put it in his
article on "The Problem of the 'Non-Appearing' Defendant Government"
(BYIL (1980), vol. 51 (1), p. 89 at 115), non-appearance leaves the "outward
43
shell" of the dispute settlement system intact but washes away the "core."
It is evident that in many if not most instances, nonparticipation by the
respondent is focused on the question of the legitimacy of the proceedings. At a
minimum it is designed to avoid enhancing that legitimacy. 4 4 But to what end?
It is by no means clear that nonparticipation is likely to produce an outcome in
the proceedings that is more favorable to the respondent.
The foregoing analysis suggests that nonparticipation may be a way of
signaling to one's opponent, other governments, the tribunal, and the public not
to expect compliance. The object is to avoid prejudicing the option to refuse to
comply with a legally binding judgment or award, and perhaps to discourage
other states from exercising their right to sue the respondent. Those objectives in
turn require us to think hard about visions of the international system that render
such tactics plausible.
The fundamental issue is not nonparticipation. Nor is it agreement or
disagreement with a tribunal's reasoning or decision. The issue is noncompliance
with a legally binding judgment or award, and with a legally binding
commitment to afford an aggrieved party the right to seek such a judgment or
award. Whether we articulate the principle at stake as the rule of law in
42.
S.China Sea Arb., Award, supra note 10, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-19 at 1180 (July 12,
2016).
43. Arctic Sunrise, Provisional Measures Order, supra note 11, Sep. Op. Wolfrum & Kelly, JJ., at
para. 6. Since Judge Wolfrum subsequently served as a member of the arbitral tribunal in the South China
Sea case, it is interesting to consider whether his views on the subject evolved. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
44.
In this connection, one might wonder what prompted the decision of the United Kingdom to
decline to send an observer to the proceedings in the South China Sea arbitration after the Tribunal granted
its request for "neutral observer status" at the hearing on the merits. See S. China Sea Arb., Award, supra
note 10, at 167 68.
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international affairs, or we deploy the conceptual vocabulary of Thomas Franck,
the question is the same: What do we need to do to encourage behavior that is
consistent with the kind of international order under which we would like to live?
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